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to hire their own advocates."'' 3 These issues were not squarely treated in the
instant case, although the Court's rationale seems clearly applicable to them.
Despite such unanswered questions, the instant decision has given the
welfare recipient an impressive measure of procedural protection. Although
rudimentary, the requirements of the pre-termination hearing should eliminate much of the bureaucratic bungling that has caused inestimable hardship
to eligible recipients. 54 Unfortunately, the new procedures may inhibit the
relaxed atmosphere that has been the goal of welfare hearings in Florida.
Balanced against the enumeration of an explicit set of standards, however,
such a disadvantage is probably justifiable. Moreover, while the instant
decision will encourage judicial uniformity in dealing with welfare hearings,
the language of the Court is broad enough to encourage expansion of the
hearing requirement to other areas.
PHILLIP

R.

FINCH

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; INDIGENT MISDEMEANANT'S
RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL: LIFTING THE
POVERTY BAR- A NEW FLORIDA STANDARD
State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1970)

The indigent petitioner was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon,'
a misdemeanor, and sentenced to pay a 500 dollar fine or serve ninety days
in jail. While imprisoned, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he was tried and convicted without having been advised either of
his right to private counsel or that counsel would be appointed for him if he
were indigent. Petitioner contended that this circumstance deprived him of

the protections of the 6th and 14th amendments. The Supreme Court of
Florida denied the petition and HELD, an indigent misdemeanant is entitled
to court appointed counsel only when the offense carries a possible penalty
of more than six-months imprisonment.2
53. Id.
54. See examples cited in Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899-900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

FLA. STAT. §790.01 (1) (1969).
2. 236 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1970).

1.
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In Gideon v. Wainwrights the United States Supreme Court held that
denial of the right to counsel guaranteed by the 6th amendment was a denial
of due process of law in violation of the 14th amendment. While Gideon
involved a felony, nine states, either by statute, case laws, or court rule, have
liberally construed the decision to provide counsel for all, or substantially all,
misdemeanants.4 Likewise, twenty-two states (including Florida) provide
counsel only for certain misdemeanors and nineteen states do not require
court appointed counsel in any misdemeanor cases at all. 6
The instant decision significantly departs from prior Florida decisions 7
3. 572 U.S. 335 (1963). Prior to Gideon the states were required to appoint counsel
only in cases involving capital crimes. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1935). In federal
courts the right to counsel has been held to be absolute, extending to all misdemeanors as
well as felonies. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
4. CAL. CoNsr. art. 1, §13(3); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §113-3(b) (Supp. 1969-1970);
MD. ANN. CODE ch. 700, R. 719(b)(1) (Supp. 1969); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 221, §340
(Supp. 1969); MINN. CONsr. art. I, §6; N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. §604-A:1 (Supp. 1969); N.Y.
CODE CRIM. PROC. §699 (McKinney Supp. 1969-1970); Tax. CODE CRIm. PROC. ANN. art.
26.05 (1966). Oregon has most recently joined this group by virtue of case decision. See
Application of Stevenson, 254 Ore. 94, 458 P.2d 414 (1969). But see Oa. REv. STAT. §133.625

(Supp. 1967).
5.

CONN. GEN. STAT. RxtV. §54-81 (a) (Supp. 1970-1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§4601-07
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§19-851, 852 (Supp. 1969); IND. CONsT. art. I, §13; IowA
CODE §775.4 (1966); ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §810 (Supp. 1970-1971); MICH. CONsT. art.
I, §20; MONT. Rav. CODES ANN. §95-1001 (4) (Supp. 1969); NEv.R v.STAT. §§171.370, 193.120.140 (1968); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§2A:158-1, -22 (Supp. 1969-1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§21-1-1 (92),
41-22-1, -10 (Supp. 1969); NM. CENr. CODE §29-07-01.1 (Supp. 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, §464 (Supp. 1969); UTAH. CODE ANN. §77-64-2 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,

(Supp. 1966);

§6503 (Supp. 1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. §62-3-1 (Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. §957.26 (Supp.

1969); N.C. Laws, 1969, ch. 1015; CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §39-21-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1969);
Am. R. GuM. P. 163; PA. R. CRuM. P. 318. Florida is now in this group by virtue
of the instant decision. But see FLA. STAT. §27.51 (1) (1969).
6. ALA. CODE tit. 15, §§318(1)-(2) (Supp. 1969); APx. STAT. ANN. §43-1203 (1969);
GA, CONsT. art. 1, §2-105; HAwAn Ray. STAT. §705-5 (1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. §62-1304 (1964);
KY. Rav. STAT. §453.190 (Supp. 1968); L&. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 513 (West 1967);
Miss. CODE ANN. §2505 (Supp. 1968); Mo. REv. STAT. §545.820 (1959); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§29-1803.01, -1804 (Supp. 1967), as amended, Neb. Laws 1969, ch. 238, §1804; OrHio Rv.
CODE ANN. §2941.50 (Page Supp. 1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2941.50 (Page Supp. 1969);
R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. §12-15-3 (Supp. 1967); S.C. CODE ANN. §17-507 (Supp. 1969); S.D.
CoMPILED LAws ANN. §23-2-1 (Supp. 1970); TENN. CODE ANN. §§40-2014, -2028 (Supp. 1969);
VA. CODE ANN. §19.1-241.1 (Supp. 1970); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §10.01.110 (Supp. 1969);
Until the instant decision Florida was also in this category. See FLA. STAT. §27.51 (1) (1969).
Wyoming has not previously required court appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases. See
Wyo. Laws 1953, ch. 180, §1. However, newly adopted Wyo. R. Coiz. P. 6 appears to make
broader provision for appointment of counsel.

7. The court arrives at the instant decision only after stating: "On the one hand is

the decision of this court in Fish affirming a lower court which had denied a court-appointed

counsel to indigent misdemeanants; and on the other hand are the Fifth Circuit federal
courts - both trial and appellate - that with the aid of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and the writ of habeas corpus are coercing our state courts in decisions that are as
distinguished for their lack of uniformity as for their lack of sound precedent, insofar as the
applicability of Gideon v. Wainwright . . . to state trials of misdemeanor charges are concerned." 236 So. 2d at 443. See generally Note, Gideon, Escobedo, Miranda: Begrudging Ac-

ceptance of the United States Supreme Court's Mandates in Florida,21 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 546

(1969).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss2/16
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The first post-Gideon case concerning whether counsel were to be appointed
in misdemeanor cases was Fish v. States in which the Supreme Court of
Florida held that Gideon applied only to felonies. This position was continued in Watkins v. Morris where the court stated "there is no absolute,
organic right to counsel in misdemeanor trials." 9 As recently as 1967 the
court in State ex rel. Taylor v. Warden of Orange Countylo upheld Fish by
denying a writ of habeas corpus to an indigent who, without trial counsel,
was convicted of municipal ordinance violations.
While the Florida courts had previously refused to extend Gideon to
misdemeanors, the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, has held
to the contrary since 1965.11 In Harvey v. Mississippi12 the defendant had
been charged with a misdemeanor punishable by ninety days imprisonment
and a 500 dollar fiine. In extending the right to counsel to misdemeanor
cases the court reasoned that a layman in a court of law, whether charged with
a misdemeanor or a felony, was in such a disadvantageous position that he
had a right to the assistance of counsel. 13
The court reaffirmed Harvey in McDonald v. Moore,14 where the defendant was sentenced to serve six-months imprisonment or pay a 250 dollar fine
after pleading guilty to a misdemeanor charge. Holding that defendant had
been denied her right to counsel the court granted a petition for habeas
corpus, assuming jurisdiction on the presumption that the Florida courts
would not overrule the precedent established by Fish.15
Harvey and Moore were both narrowly decided, and it is not dear whether
these decisions require a guarantee of counsel in all criminal cases. 16 A
federal district court in Florida recently held that Harvey and subsequent
cases guarantee counsel where the potential penalty resulting from conviction

8. 159 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1964).
9. 179 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 1965).
10. 193 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1967).
11. Bohr v. Purdy, 412 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1969); James v. Headley, 410 F.2d
Cir. 1969); Goslin v. Thomas, 400 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1968); McDonald v. Moore,
106 (5th Cir. 1965); Harvey v. Mississippi, 840 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1965). See also
Hendry, 408 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1969); Boyer v. City of Orlando, 402 F.2d 966

325 (5th
353 F.2d
Colon v.
(5th Cir.

1968).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
counsel

840 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 269.
853 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
McDonald v. Moore, 858 F.2d 106, 107 (5th Cir. 1965).
In James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1969), Justice Wisdom suggests that
should be provided in all proceedings where the defendant faces a potential loss

of liberty for any length of time whatsoever "except those types of offense for which
punishment is not likely to be imposed, regardless of their denomination as felonies, misdemeanors, or otherwise." Id. at 384. See also AMRICAN BAR AssoCrAnON PROjECr ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTIcE (1968). Additional criteria for appointment of
counsel suggested by Justice Wisdom were where the offense charged involved "moral turpitude"; where convictions may result in revocation of a license that might deprive one of his
livelihood; or where the defendant's intelligence was limited and the issues involved were
complex. 410 F.2d at 334. However, this particular portion of the opinion in fames was not
concurred in by the other justices. The exact position of the court thus remains obscure.
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of all pending charges is more than ninety days incarceration. 1 However,
since the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, has never decided
a case involving these issues where the penalty was less than ninety days in
jail, the criterion for requiring appointment of counsel may eventually be
reduced even below this ninety-day standard.
In explaining its rationale for adopting the six-month rather than the
ninety-day test, the court in the instant case stated that its object was "to
adopt the decision of the federal court of this judicial circuit that ...most
nearly approximates any decision... that might be adopted by the Supreme
Court of the United States."1s The court adopted the standard established
in Brinson v. State in which a federal district court held that counsel was
required whenever the defendant was charged with a "serious offense."' 1
The measure of seriousness, the court reasoned, was directly related to the
length of the sentence. In support of this position the court cited the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964,20 which divided federal public offenses into three categories: (1) felonies, (2) misdemeanors, and (3) petty offenses. Petty offenses
were defined as any offense for which the potential penalty was a fine of 500
dollars or less or imprisonment for six months or less. 21
The two assumptions upon which the instant decision is apparently based
are that the "serious offense" standard promulgated in Brinson is valid and
that the principles applicable to a determination of the right to a trial by
jury also apply in determining the right to counsel. In James v. Headley,22
however, the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, expressly rejected
the serious offense standard. The court argued that offenses were categorized
in the Criminal Justice Act to facilitate systematic compensation of counsel,
and that Congress never intended that those charged with petty offenses
should be denied the right to appointed counsel.23 Moreover, the court
denied the validity of any constitutional distinction between felonies and
misdemeanors or between gross and petty offenses because it saw little
difference "between the loss of liberty for 181 days and the loss of liberty
4
for 180 or fewer days."2
17. Wooley v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 308 F. Supp. 1194 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
18. 236 So. 2d at 443.
19. 273 F. Supp. 840, 843 (S.D. Fla. 1967). The court in Brinson derived this standard
from In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), a Supreme Court decision involving a juvenile's right

to counsel.
20. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 552 (1964), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §3006A
(1964).

21. 18 U.S.C. §1 (1964).
22. 410 F.2d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 1969).
23. "The bill as passed by the Senate is restricted in scope to felonies and misdemeanors
other than petty offenses. The House version of the bill would cover all criminal cases,
including petty offenses .... The constitutional mandate of the Sixth Amendment is with-

out doubt applicable to petty offenses, but it is the view of the conferees that adequate
representation may be afforded defendants in such cases without the need for providing for
compensation for counsel. In this way, money appropriated under the act will not be
dissipated from the areas of greatest need, cases involving representation for crimes punish.
able by more than 6 months' imprisonment." CoNF. REP. No. 1709, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.,
U.S. CODE CONG. S:
AD.Naws 3000, 3002-03 (1964).

24. 410 F.2d 325, 333 (5th Cir. 1969).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss2/16
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In the instant case the Florida supreme court analogized that since the
right to trial by jury extends only to offenses punishable by more than six
months imprisonment, 25 the right to counsel should be similarly limited.
This reasoning was also attacked in James where the court concluded that
the petty offense exception to the right to trial by jury does not require the
26
imposition of a coextensive exception to the right to appointed counsel.
The James court indicated that the right to counsel may be more fundamental than the right to trial by jury27 and cited with approval an opinion
of the Supreme Court of Minnesota that stated: "It is conceivable that a fair
trial may be had before an impartial judge without a jury, but it is hardly
conceivable that a person ignorant in the2sfield of law can adequately defend
himself without the assistance of counsel."
Significantly, the instant decision abolishes older classification standards
for right to counsel and inserts a standard based on the duration of potential
imprisonment. Historically, crimes have been artificially classified into different categories such as felonies, misdemeanors, petty offenses, quasi-crimes, and
high misdemeanors. The inequities of these classifications are apparent by
virtue of the fact that what may be classified as a misdemeanor in one state
may be a felony in another,29 and punishment for the same crime may vary
from place to place 30 Even the classic definitions of a felony as an offense
punishable by death or imprisonment in a state penitentiary for more than
one year and of a misdemeanor as including all other offenses"' is not uniformly accepted among the different jurisdictions.3 2 In Florida, for instance,
any crime punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison is a felony;
all other offenses are considered misdemeanors.33 The differentiating factor
is the place of imprisonment rather than its duration.4 Although differences

25. See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
26. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 333 (5th Cir. 1969).
27. See Goslin v. Thomas, 400 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1968).
28. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 398, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967); cited by the court in
James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 333 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Comment, Right to Counsel
for Misdemeanants: A Post-Gideon View, 22 Sw. L.J. 679 (1968).
29. E.g., adultery is a felony in Florida (as in most states), FIA. STAT. §798.01 (1969);
but a misdemeanor in Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-908 (1964).
30. E.g., the penalty in Mississippi for "promotion of gambling" can be up to 20 days
imprisonment, Miss. CoDE ANN. §2190 (1942); in New York the maximum penalty is one
year, N. Y. PENAL LAw §225.05 (McKinney 1967).
31. The distinction between imprisonment for a year for a misdemeanor and imprisonment for a year and a day for a felony is really a distinction without a difference as far
as the unrepresented (and possibly innocent) indigent misdemeanant is concerned. Even
acknowledging the additional difference that a felon loses his civil rights, this should not be
a distinction sufficient to deny the misdemeanant the right to counsel.
32. E.g., kidnapping is considered a "high misdemeanor" in New Jersey and is
punishable by life imprisonment, N.J. REv. STAT. §2A:118-1 (Supp. 1968).
33. FLA. STAT. §775.08 (1969).
34. There is, for example, one misdemeanor in Florida for which violators may be
imprisoned for a maximum of five years and fined as much as $5000. FLA. STAT. §548. 01
(1969) (engaging in pugilistic exhibition or fight for profit).
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among jurisdictions are not harmful in all cases they would never seem to
justify a denial of basic constitutional rights.
While the principal decision laudably precludes many of the inequities
caused by the artificial classification of crimes, it leaves unanswered several
ancillary, but important, questions. One of these is whether a defendant
charged with several counts of petty offenses is entitled to appointed counsel
where each count carries a relatively minor penalty, but the sum total of all
potential charges exceeds the six-month standard established in the instant
decision. In James v. Headley the Fifth Circuit, United States Court of
Appeals, indicated that each count should not be treated separately, but
that the maximum potential sentence resulting from conviction of all counts
should be considered.A related question is whether imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine
should be considered in determining whether the potential penalty is within
the six-month standard. 38 A recent decision of the Fifth Circuit answered this
question in the affirmative 37 holding that when an indigent defendant is
faced with a choice of a fine or imprisonment he has, in fact, no choice at all.
One commentator has stated: "Clearly to levy a punishment which calls for
the extraction of property from an indigent defendant, who by definition
(and in fact) is a man destitute of property, is to lead him up a cul de sac;
for it is the imposition of a punishment which the courts well know is not
within the defendant's power to perform." 38
A third question that the court leaves unanswered is whether defendants
charged with violations of municipal ordinances will be protected by the
instant case.30 While in Florida no penalty for violation of a municipal
ordinance may exceed six months, substantial periods of imprisonment may
result from conviction of several counts of the same offense or multiple
35. 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Wooley v. City of Jacksonville, 308 F. Supp.
1194 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
36. See Note, Imprisonment of Indigents for Nonpayment of Fines, 31 OrIO ST. L.J.
342 (1970).
37. Matthews v. Florida, 422 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1970).
38.

Comment, Continuing Echoes of Gideon's Trumpet- The Indigent Defendant and

the Misdemeanor; A New Crisis Involving the Assistance of Counsel in "A Criminal Trial,"
10 S. TEx. LJ. 222, 267 (1968).
39. In interpreting and applying Gideon the Fifth Circuit has drawn no distinction
between violations of state misdemeanors and violations of municipal ordinances-the
latter also falling under the aegis of Harvey. See, e.g., Bohr v. Purdy, 412 F.2d 321 (5th
Cir. 1969). In Boyer v. City of Orlando, 402 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1968), the defendant was
found guilty of violating several municipal ordinances and was fined $240 or, in lieu thereof,
to serve 120 days in jail. The indigent defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus asserting he
had been denied the guaranties of the sixth amendment. The Fifth Circuit remanded and
ordered that the defendant exhaust all state remedies noting that the court had decided
numerous cases extending the right to counsel since Florida's original decision of Fish v.
State in 1964. As a result of the impact of these federal decisions the court of appeals concluded that Florida's judgment on the matter may have been altered and that effective
state remedies might exist. Shortly after the instant decision was handed down, Boyer again
came before the Florida supreme court, which on jurisdictional grounds refused to rule
on the question of extending the right to counsel in municipal ordinance prosecutions. 232
So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1970).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss2/16
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violations. Since Florida courts have not considered municipal ordinance
violations to be misdemeanors, 40 it is not clear that an indigent defendant
would be protected by the instant case, even if "tacking" of counts to
determine the total potential sentence were allowed.
The instant decision is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, however,
the question remains whether any of the courts have gone far enough.
The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized that "the basic and fundamental 'due process' right guaranteed by the 14th Amendment must be held
to include the 6th Amendment right-to-counsel .. .. ",41 Nonetheless, the
court is understandably reluctant to apply this right to the so-called "lowest
echelons of petty offenders and hand out to them the free service of an
elaborate and expensive public defender system to defend them against charges
42

of overparking or other petty offenses.."

43
When the limitations of purse and personnel are realistically considered,
at what point should the constitutional obligation of right to counsel begin?
Any expansion of the right to counsel will have a significant effect upon
the bench and bar. In 1965 there were estimated to be approximately 5 million
persons charged with misdemeanors each year throughout the United States
(excluding minor traffic code violations), with an estimated 700,000 of them
eventually being imprisoned.44 Of these 5 million, approximately twenty-five
per cent, or 1 4 million, were indigent. 45 Appointment of counsel for all these
indigents would entail an eight-fold increase in the demand for court
appointed lawyers.4 6 As many as 20,000 full-time lawyers, both prosecution
and defense, would be needed in order to meet the requirements of adequate

40. Generally speaking, violations of municipal ordinances are not considered crimes in
Florida. See Note, Municipal Ordinance Violations in Florida: Selected Due Process Considerations, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 580 (1970). However, convictions can result in imprisonment

for substantial periods of time. For instance, violations of the municipal code in Tampa,
Florida, can result in a $500 fine or six months imprisonment or both. TAMPA, Fl., CoDE
§1-7 (1953). Equal protection safeguards should not be denied to persons accused of violating municipal ordinances because the effect of conviction is, in essence, the same as that
for misdemeanors.
41. 236 So. 2d at 444.
42.

Id.

43. The commentators have addressed themselves to this problem and have offered a
number of alternative solutions. See generally NATIONAL LE.AL Am & DEFENm Ass'W,
EQUAL JusrcE FOR THE AccusEr (1959); Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor
Cases, 43 WASH. L. REv. 685 (1968); Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota:
Some Field Findings and Legal Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 68-69, 77 (1963);
Note, The Indigent Misdemeanant's Right to Counsel- An Extension of Gideon v. Wainwright, 18 DRAKE L. REv. 109 (1968); Note, An Adequate Defense for the Indigent, 59 J.
CRim. L.C. 8 P.S. 73, 84 (1968); Note, Right to Counsel for Misdemeanants: A Post-Gideon
View, 22 Sw. L.J. 679 (1968); Comment, The Right to Counsel for Misdemeanants in State
Courts, 20 ARK. L. Ra. 156 (1966); Comment, Right to Court Appointed Counsel for Misdemeanants in Virginia, 4 RICHMOND L. RE v. 306 (1970); Comment, note 38 supra. See also

State ex rel. Taylor v. Warden of Orange County, 193 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1967) (Ervin,
J., dissenting opinion).
44. 1 L SILVERSTEIN,
10 (1965).
45. Id. at 125.
46. Id. at 123.

DEFENSE
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representation. In 1966 less than half the necessary lawyers were available.47
The cost of adequately expanding representation has been variously estimated
from $28 million to $158 million per year, depending on the type of
appointed counsel system used.4 8 A number of solutions to the myriad
problems caused by expansion of constitutional rights have been suggested:
(1) expansion of assigned counsel programs, 49 (2) greater use of law students,6° (3) expansion of the public defender system,5 ' (4) expansion of the
Office of Economic Opportunity's legal services and program. 52 All solutions,
however, require extensive funding for which adequate sources must be
found.
Perhaps the most equitable and constitutionally sufficient standard would
be that counsel must be appointed where the offense charged could result in
imprisonment. Since criminal and quasi-criminal offenses are almost without
exception punishable optionally with imprisonment, however, such a standard
would unreasonably be a burden upon the legal system. A modified imprisonment-in-fact standard would seem preferable. That is, counsel should be
appointed for indigent offenders where the sentence imposed usually results
in imprisonment; however, counsel need not be provided in criminal trials
where imprisonment is not the usual penalty, even though the statute or
53
ordinance may provide for it.
An imprisonment-in-fact situation would seem nearly always to exist when
an indigent person is charged with an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment, since by definition in no case could such a person pay the fine. 54
Imprisonment in these cases would necessarily result except where sentence
was suspended or adjudication was withheld. Such a situation would also seem
to exist where a defendant whether indigent or not is likely to receive
"straight time" because of past repetitive criminal conduct or the peculiarly
aggravated character of the criminal act in question.
47. Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D.
389, 393-94 (1966). Additional demands for counsel will arise if the expansion of the right

to counsel extends to pretrial and post-conviction representation, such as that provided
for felons. See generally Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal
Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REv. 1054 (1963).
48. THE PREsmENT's COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COuRTs 56-57 (1967).
49. See NATIONAL LEGAL Am & DEmNDE Ass'N, note 43 supra; Junker, note 43 supra;
Note, The Indigent Misdemeanant's Right to Counsel-An Extension of Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 43, at 115-17.

50. See note 48 supra.
51. See note 48 supra.
52. See Curran, Unavailability of Lawyer's Services for Low Income Persons, 4 VALPARAiso L. REV. 308 (1970).
53. In a survey conducted in Seattle, Washington, it was found that there was at least
a small chance of imprisonment in all nontraffic cases. In three categories of traffic cases
imprisonment was a distinct possibility: (1) where the offenses were hit-and-run, reckless,

or drunk driving; (2) where the defendant was under suspension for ap revious violation;
(5) where the defendant could not pay the fine imposed. See NATIONAL LEGAL Am & DEFENDER ASS'N, How To ORGANIZE A DEFENDER OFFICE 40-48 (1967).
54. Compare People v. McMillan, 53 Misc. 2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Orange County
Ct., N.Y. 1967), with Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F. Supp. 732 (D. Md. 1968).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss2/16
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In any case, implementation of an imprisonment-in-fact rule would require
an initial (and time consuming) determination of indigency by the court.
It is not unlikely that in some instances a defendant might be indigent to
the extent that he could not retain counsel yet be solvent enough to pay the
customary fine. Thus, determinations of indigence should be based in these
cases upon ability to pay the fine rather than the ability to retain counsel.
It would seem impractical as well as undesirable to suggest that courts inquire
in advance into the particular facts of each case beyond noting the
past criminal record of the accused. Even this limited inquiry may be
criticized on the ground that it may cause prejudging of cases.
Adoption of a modified imprisonment-in-fact standard would also be
problematical in that some unrepresented defendants would be sentenced to
imprisonment when usual sentence in similar cases was otherwise. In such
cases a new trial, with the assistance of counsel, should be conducted
although it necessarily impairs judicial efficiency.55
While the problem of providing counsel to indigent misdemeanants is not
an easy one to resolve it is evident that some solution is necessary. Since
Gideon the Florida state courts and the United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit, have been in conflict. The decision in the instant case will
substantially diminish the controversy but will by no means extinguish it.
The question in Boyer involving municipal ordinance violations, for instance,
is not answered by the instant decision. 56 While the Fifth Circuit rule requires
counsel, the Florida rule will not permit it. The result of such a position
will likely be a continued "impasse existing between [the Fifth Circuit] and
the Supreme Court of Florida over the right to counsel."57 In the instant case
all seven justices agreed that the right to counsel should be extended to

include some misdemeanants, but three justices argued that the court did not
extend the right far enough. Justice Boyd, speaking for the dissenting
minority, asserted that any indigent charged with violating any state law or
municipal ordinance punishable by imprisonment is entitled to counsel at
58

government expense.
The instant case indicates the need for the United States Supreme Court
to enunciate its position. Since 1966 the Court has denied certiorari in three
cases involving an indigent misdemeanant's right to appointed counsel. 59
55. There are additional liabilities inherent in provision of right to counsel in imprisonment-in-fact situations. Although a man of means has the finandal ability to be
represented by counsel, there are many misdemeanors for which the expense of an attorney
far outweighs any benefit expected from the use of his skills. To guarantee appointed
counsel to the indigent for all imprisonment-in-fact offenses would, in essence, deny the
nonindigent equal protection of the laws. Therefore, there must be some limitation upon
this right. Counsel could be appointed for instance, only for those offenses for which counsel
is usually utilized.
56. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
57. Colon v. Hendry, 408 F.2d 864, 865 (5th Cir. 1969).
58. 236 So. 2d at 446.
59. Heller v. State, 154 Conn. 743, 226 A.2d 521, cert. denied sub nom., Heller v. Connecticut, 389 U.S. 902 (1967); DeJoseph v. State, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752, cert. denied
sub nom., Dejoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966); Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397
S.W.2d 364 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
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In Winters v. Beck ° Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion, pointed out
that the "Court has a duty to resolve the conflict and clarify the scope of
Gideon v. Wainwright."61 The defendant in the instant case has applied for
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The Court should unequivocally resolve
the questions mentioned above, hopefully recognizing adequate constitutional
requisites granting representation to all persons accused of offenses punishable
with a loss of liberty. Until the Supreme Court acts, the state and federal
62
courts will remain in hopeless conflict.
HAL H. KANTOR

60. 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
61. Id. at 908.
62. Illustrative of the existing conflict are the following cases, which arose in Connecticut. In Dejoseph v. State, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752, cert. denied sub. nom.,
Dejoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966), defendant, an indigent unable to afford
counsel and therefore unrepresented, was convicted of a misdemeanor. His conviction was
upheld by the state supreme court, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
In Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397 (D. Conn. 1966), the defendant was convicted of the
same crime as the defendant in Dejoseph. The federal district court granted his petition
for habeas corpus, holding that the state's failure to appoint counsel was a denial of due
process of law.
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